







Taxes Versus Regulation:  















Our central concern in this paper is to examine some alternative policies for physically containing the 
growth of urban areas. We undertake a microsimulation to provide a comparison between land use 
planning policies that enforce an urban growth boundary and policies that limit development at the 
periphery using taxes. We parameterise our microsimulation using the structure of demand and policy 
implemented in a rapidly growing city in the south of England. We make no judgment as to the 
optimality or otherwise of the existing degree of constraint: we take that as datum and analyse only the 
welfare costs, distributional impacts and effects on urban densities of alternative ways of achieving the 
currently observed degree of constraint. The methodology we deploy to address these issues could be 
turned to a wide range of other urban modeling purposes. It has the advantage of being clearly founded 
in microeconomic theory and applies observed behavioural relationships, estimated from the relevant 
economic data. We find that the use of a tax on land could produce the same limitation on growth as 
existing regulatory policies but provide higher equilibrium welfare levels. We find that the use of a tax 
on transport costs, however, while capable of producing a compact urban form, would not raise welfare 
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One of the paradoxes of urban economic development is that resident households desire the personal 
consumption of space in all of its pleasant varieties, and strive to limit the indulgence of this desire 
exhibited by their fellow citizens. Each household seeks to consume private space as a location and 
surrounding garden for a residence, and can generally be expected to devote a considerable portion of 
income towards its acquisition. When others do this, however, the process is sometimes strenuously 
opposed and decried as ￿sprawl￿. The tension is made more severe in times of rising incomes and/or 
falling transportation costs because these tend to encourage an increase in private consumption of land. 
 
Part of the rationale for this tension is that private consumption of space is not the only way that space 
can generate utility for the household. Open space is an alternative use that is valued by nearby 
households. It may be available both in the form of a public good that is accessible to local households, 
and in the form of private use (by other consumers or producers) that provides external benefits in the 
form of visual amenity or spatial separation from noxious uses. The public good nature of open space 
suggests that without policy intervention, it will be underprovided.  
 
Our central concern in this paper is to examine some alternative policies for implementing development 
controls. We undertake a microsimulation to provide a comparison between land use planning policies 
that enforce an urban growth boundary and policies that limit development at the periphery using taxes. 
We parameterise our microsimulation using the structure of demand and policy implemented in a rapidly 
growing city in the south of England. 
 
One (optimistic) way to understand the tension over urban development is to regard zoning and concerns 
over sprawl as part of the community struggle to ensure an optimal provision of the public benefits of 
open space. Of course, policies that limit urban development can also increase the wealth of the owners 
of residential property within the constrained communities, so that it is also possible that development 
controls are simply rent seeking activities. The efficiency of the actual level of development control 
chosen is not addressed here but is taken as datum. It is the focus of the analysis reported in Cheshire 
and Sheppard [2002]. 
 
That households value both private land consumption and the different varieties of open space seems 
clear. Amongst others, Cheshire and Sheppard [1995] and [1999] have quantified the impact on land 
values and the structure of demand for accessible open space, inaccessible open space, and private land 
                                                 
1 We would like to thank the Leverhulme Foundation for its support for the work underlying this paper.   3 
consumption. Naturally, the fact that open space is valuable does not demonstrate that it is 
underprovided (or overprovided).  
 
The  efficiency  of urban development is central to the concept of ￿sprawl￿. Brueckner [2001] and 
Brueckner and Kim [2000] take this as a starting point and provide a useful economic evaluation of the 
various reasons for public concern over ￿sprawl￿. It is worth noting the concerns they identify as the 
sources of the inefficiency associated with sprawl, because these indicate the relevant potential policy 
responses. The primary sources of economic inefficiency associated with sprawl are the loss of public 
good amenities arising from the development of open space at the periphery, and the increase in 
commuting (and associated pollution and congestion) that comes with low-density development. 
 
A standard economic response would be to design policies that rely on taxation of any inefficient 
activities (whether commuting or development of peripheral land) in order to internalise the external 
costs. In Britain, and increasingly in the United States, land use policies have generally not relied on 
taxation. Instead direct regulation of land development has been employed. In the British context this 
comes via the Town and Country Planning System that provides a national framework for local and 
regional regulation of land use and urban development. In the United States the call for ￿smart growth￿ 
policies such as urban growth boundaries (UGBs) has become more pronounced, and such boundaries 
have been extensively applied in some areas. A useful taxonomy and discussion of these policies in the 
U.S. is presented in Downs [2001]. In Britain, many of these policies have been employed for decades. 
We suggest that a closer examination of the UK context can contribute to our understanding of how such 
policies might work, and what alternatives are available.  
 
There have been numerous proponents of the use of tax incentive policies for containing urban 
development. For example, American Farmland Trust [1997] advocates ￿differential assessment￿ as a 
means of preserving land in agricultural use at the urban periphery. Essentially, this means application of 
lower property tax rates to land in agricultural use, and raising the rate if the land is converted to urban 
use. The difference between the agricultural and residential rate provides a direct tax on the process of 
urban land conversion at the periphery. 
 
This sort of differential assessment is to some extent used in the UK although the land use consequences 
are minimal because the levels of property taxation (￿Council tax￿) are low even for land in urban use 
and are not directly related to the area of land used for residential purposes. Land in purely agricultural 
use (such as cropland) is not subject to rates, although ￿non-agricultural￿ activities on farms are subject 
to business rates. Proposals have been put forward by the Department of Environment, Transport, and 
Regions [2000] to provide reduced or eliminated taxation for these non-agricultural activities on small   4 
farms. Land in urban use (such as for residential purposes) is subject to a tax that varies with the value of 
the property (including structure) and across local authorities. The average annual tax over all authorities 
and types of residential properties is on the order of ₤650 (about $1000) per annum. 
 
Commuting is also taxed (both in the UK and the United States) in the form of taxes on fuel and 
vehicles, and such increases in the operating cost per mile increase the incentives to live near the urban 
centre (or at least near employment centres). Whether these taxes have a measurable impact on actual 
land use patterns is less obvious, but proponents of higher fuel taxation often cite the reduction in 
commuting and the more compact urban form such taxes would be expected to generate. 
 
Both differential rates of land taxation and taxation on commuting seem to offer alternatives to the 
regulatory maintenance of an urban growth boundary. If we are to contemplate the policy alternative of 
using land taxation or taxation of commuting as an alternative mechanism for limiting urban sprawl, we 
must answer several questions: 
 
•  Is it possible? That is, can we find levels of taxation that, when applied in an urban context 
produce an equilibrium that uses the same amount of land as is produced by the regulatory 
approach of the UGB? 
•  What levels of taxation are required (and implicitly, would they be politically feasible)?  
•  Would these alternative policies increase or reduce the average welfare level compared to 
imposing a UGB? 
•  What are the potential distributional consequences of alternative policies? 
•  What impact might such taxes have on densities and the physical form of cities? 
 
Our analysis below addresses these questions regarding the alternative policies of using differential land 
taxation and using ad valorem taxation on the ￿operating costs￿ of transport as mechanisms to restrict the 
urban area to one that uses the same amount of land as is used in the status quo. One aspect of using 
taxation for such policies is the revenue raised. We assume that the revenues are spent locally with 
efficiency and equality (so that they are equivalent to an equal income transfer to each household that 
exhausts the total revenue raised). Other assumptions are clearly possible, including the polar extreme in 
which none of the tax revenues are returned to the community. Although they are not presented below, 
we have examined this polar extreme case and while it is certainly less attractive from a welfare 
perspective the basic quality of the results is not greatly affected. 
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Before proceeding to our analysis, we pause to inquire whether the welfare impacts or relative merits of 
alternative policies are either obvious or implied by theoretical considerations. An initial reaction might 
follow one of two opposing arguments. On the one hand there is a relatively standard price theory 
argument indicating that imposing a tax on a commodity and then rebating the amount of the tax 
collected back to the consumer (equivalent to maximal efficiency in public expenditure) will never make 
the consumer better off.  
 
An alternative argument is derived from a focus on revenue raised from the tax and a comparison with 
the existing system. With an UGB or other planning constraint, the ￿tax￿ imposed on urban residents is 
implicit. These come in the form of either more expensive land (and hence housing) resulting from the 
reduced supply of land for private residential consumption within the urban area, or in the form of 
increased commuting costs resulting from choice of location outside of the constrained area and 
commuting ￿across the greenbelt￿ or from neighboring jurisdictions. The tax ￿revenues￿ in this case are 
not used to provide local public goods nor rebated to all households within the urban area, but rather 
accrue as capital gains to owners of land with planning permission (many of whom may reside outside 
the urban area), as incomes for lawyers who specialize in planning appeals, or as incomes to those who 
provide transport services. This argument suggests that since the anti-sprawl tax policies we consider 
below incorporate local expenditure of tax revenues in the form of rebates, they must of necessity 
generate higher welfare for urban residents. 
 
There are some difficulties with both of these arguments. The first argument compares the situation with 
constrained land use to a situation with unconstrained land consumption, and fails to consider the public 
good value of a reduction in urban sprawl. It also neglects redistributive impacts of tax policies. A tax on 
land in urban use, for example, may generate disproportionate revenue from more affluent consumers of 
housing with large lots. Equal rebates to each household (or public expenditures available to all residents 
equally) could provide a net transfer to lower income residents that results in an increase in average 
welfare levels. 
 
The second argument may be excessively optimistic in expecting an inevitable increase in welfare. 
When choosing between anti-sprawl policies it might be helpful to ask which is likely to be associated 
with the least ￿deadweight loss￿. The relative elasticity of demand of the aspect of consumption that is 
taxed (whether explicitly or implicitly) will determine the cost of achieving any anti-sprawl benefits. In 
this situation it is possible that a policy regime may make inefficient use of ￿revenues￿ but be preferable 
to an alternative that spends revenues more efficiently but generates them from a less efficient tax. 
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These observations suggest the appropriateness of using a microsimulation exercise as the basis of our 
analysis. The desirability of alternative policies will depend on the structure of demand and the 
distribution of income. These factors can be accounted for within the simulation, and the relative merits 
of alternative policies evaluated. 
 
Our microsimulation utilises a modified ￿monocentric￿ model comprised of individuals whose demand is 
based on the demand system whose estimates are presented below. While the model is similar to models 
familiar from the urban economics literature, it incorporates a variety of features that permit 
representation of some of the complexities of the actual urban area whose housing market and setting are 
used to estimate the structure of demand and parameterise the model. In the next section we describe 
these data, and in the following section we present our analysis of the structure of demand for house 
characteristics and neighbourhood amenities. Making central use of the demand for private residential 
land, this structure is then used in sections 4, 5 and 6 to present estimates of the baseline level of land 
use regulation and to examine two fiscal alternatives to this regulation. Section 7 provides a summary of 
our results and some concluding remarks on the viability and desirability of these policy options. 
 
2. Data and Setting 
 
Our data are drawn from the urban area of Reading, England. The city is located on the Thames about 35 
miles west of central London. Reading is subject to considerable pressure for growth and residential 
development, and in response has adopted some of the most restrictive planning policies in the United 
Kingdom. With frequent high-speed rail links to London, proximity to Heathrow airport and other 
location advantages the area has attracted a number of technology firms
2 and more generally follows the 
development patterns typical of prosperous, middle-size cities of the southeast of England. Despite its 
proximity to London, Reading is a major employment centre with more than 85 percent of its employed 
residents working locally and a strong central business district employment concentration.  
 
The city had in 1991 a metro area population of approximately 337000 persons comprising 129000 
households. At the time of the 1993 survey we estimate that there were 131370 households. Our initial 
sample of properties comprised over 870 separate structures. This provided a sample of approximately 
20% of the residential properties offered for sale by major estate agents in the autumn of 1993.  Postal 
surveys with follow up were directed to each address in the sample to collect information on the actual 
sales price of the structure, and the income and demographic composition of the household. Responses 
from approximately 461 households were ultimately obtained, with complete response (including 
income and family structure) from 310 households. 
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Supplemental information on land use was assembled from Ordnance Survey resources and aerial 
photographs. Data on secondary school catchment areas and school quality was obtained from the local 
education authorities. Census data from 1991 were used for the ethnic and socio-economic 
characteristics of local neighbourhoods. 
 
 
3. Hedonic Analysis of Demand 
 
In order to estimate the structure of demand for land and open space, we must first obtain estimates of 
the implicit prices of land and other structure and neighbourhood attributes. We do this by estimating the 
modified linear Box-Cox hedonic price function given in equation (1). Note that the value function for 
urban residential land, specified in equation (2), is estimated directly as part of the hedonic price 
function. The land rent is ￿monotonic￿ only in the sense that it is radially symmetric: land value must 
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land rent function defined below 
 




are the standard parameters of the Box-Cox functional form. 
 
  () () () 4 3 2 n x
1 e x r
β − θ ⋅ ⋅ β + β ⋅ ⋅ β = θ
sin ,  (2) 
 
Where    
x  =  Distance from the city center 
θ  =  Angle of deflection from the city center 
n  =  Number of ￿ridges￿ in land value, representing radial asymmetries 
βi  =  Estimated parameters of land value function 
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The estimated parameters for the hedonic price function are presented in Appendix Table 1 below. 
Searching over a small grid (1-4) it was determined that a rent function with n=3 ridges provided the 
best fit to the data. The estimated land value depends on the location and also the size of the lot and type 
of structure built upon it. For a structure matching the sample mean in all attributes (except location) the 
spatial structure of the land value function is illustrated below in Figure 1. The surface is viewed from 
the southeast looking towards the northwest, and projected on the land value surface are the locations of 
sample observations and major transport routes. This measure of the value of land is essentially the price 
of ￿land as pure space with accessibility￿. Actual market prices of vacant land include the capitalized 
value of all the local amenities, neighbourhood characteristics and local public goods to which 
occupation of the land gives access. As was shown in Cheshire and Sheppard 1998 these amenity values 
may exceed the value of land as pure space with accessibility
3. The land tax analysed below is a tax on 
the value of ￿land as pure space with accessibility￿ and so might most usefully be called a pure land tax. 
 
 
Figure 1: Estimated Land Value Surface Viewed From Southeast 
 
Appendix Table 2 provides some descriptive statistics for the sample and the estimated attribute prices 
and expenditure shares for structure and neighbourhood attributes. These are used in estimating the 
demand system, which in turn is used as the basis of our microsimulation. 
 
We begin with a basic Almost Ideal Demand System linearised in the fashion suggested by Deaton and 
Muellbauer [1980]: 
                                                 
3 In the data studied in Cheshire and Sheppard (1998) the amenity values were greater by a factor of up to eight.   9 
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We then adapt this to capture the effects of household demographic structure, and to take account of the 
fact that there is no in-sample variation in the prices of those attributes that are measured in a 
dichotomous fashion. Some further discussion is presented in Cheshire and Sheppard [1998] and [2002]. 
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Where:    
wi  =  Expenditure share on attribute i 
νai, νbi, δi and γij  =  Demand system parameters to be estimated 
P ￿   =  Structure value estimated using the hedonic price function 
i α   =  () ∑
∈
⋅ γ + α δ − α
D k
k ik 0 i i p ln (demand parameters to be estimated) 




ik 1 ￿ (demand parameters to be estimated) 
A  =  Number of adults present in the household 
B  =  Number of children present in the household 
ψ β ￿ , ￿
k   =  Estimated parameters from the hedonic price function 
M =  Household  income 
I
* =  Stone￿s price index,  ∑ =
i
i i p w I ln ln *  
pj  =  Price of house attribute or local amenity estimated from hedonic 
C  =  Indices of attributes that are ￿continuously￿ variable 
D  =  Indices of dichotomous attributes 
 
In order to estimate this demand system using single-market data we construct instruments for attribute 
prices using the prices faced by the two nearest observations in the sample, plus the distance between the 
observation and these ￿nearest neighbours￿. The estimated demand system parameters are presented in 
Appendix tables 3 and 4. Particularly for those variable attributes, whose demand structure plays a 
central role in our analysis, the models work well. 
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4. Baseline Level of Development Control 
 
Having estimated a demand system we have access to an indirect utility function and expenditure 
function based on the estimated parameters. We use this for analysis of policy alternatives, calculating 
new urban equilibria
4, and evaluating the welfare consequences of these policies. The first step in our 
analysis is to establish the baseline utility and structure of development control. We do this by 
constructing a ￿representative agent￿ urban economy in which all households in the urban area are of a 
single household type whose demographic structure and income is equal to the sample mean for these 
variables. Letting land be indexed as good 1, with its price represented as r, the expenditure function 
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All variables are as defined in equation (4), M is the (common) household income level, and the 
transport costs (with operating costs as estimated by the Automobile Association) are given by: 
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with 
τ1= 2.5  Operating cost of ₤2.5 per 10 metres  
τ2= 7200  Annual cost of a 1 hour daily commute at mean income levels 
τ3= 500  Speed (tens of metres per hour) at edge of CBD 
τ4= 4  Increase in travel speed as distance from CBD increases 
τ5= 0.0922  Matches asymmetry in land rent function estimated from hedonic 
τ6= 3.2674  Based on estimated land rent function in hedonic 
 
Using these transport cost parameters generates a land rent function derived from the expenditure 
function that matches the estimate obtained from the estimated hedonic. With these parameters we then 
obtain an estimated common utility level for the representative household in equilibrium. The 
expenditure function implies a land rent function for each utility level: 
 
                                                 
4 The evidence in relation to the empirical realism of assuming equilibrium in this urban land market was discussed in 
Cheshire and Sheppard [2002]. In general the evidence was consistent with the land (housing) market being in or very close 
to equilibrium. Equilibrium, apart from being implicit in the estimation of any hedonic price function, has the further useful 
property for the present analysis in that it implies that all land made available for occupation by the planning system is in fact 
’consumed’.  As discussed below this allows us to infer the planning determined supply of housing land and model 
alternatives to that supply which would be consistent with the observed values of other relevant variables.    11 
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We solve for the utility level that generates a land rent function providing the best approximation to the 
observed pattern of land rents obtained in the sample. This provides an estimated status quo utility level 
of u = 15.0631. 
 
We model development controls as consisting both of restrictions on the fraction of land within the 
urban area made available for development, denoted by ω, and an urban growth boundary modeled as a 
maximum extent of allowed development.  
 
We capture the urban growth boundary by constructing a border at which residential land values fall to a 
particular level that would be set by the planning authority. Not only does this provide a representation 
of the status quo policy that closely matches the observed physical pattern of development, but it can 
also be justified by noting that defense of the urban growth boundary is itself a costly process. 
Allocation of resources within the Town and Country planning system will then be focused on those 
parts of the periphery under the most pressure for development. The result tends to produce a uniform 
value of residential land along the effective urban growth boundary, which itself then exhibits the same 
asymmetries as exist in the land value function.   
 
The observations that are furthest from the CBD in our sample have estimated land rents that translate to 
a purchase price for land as pure space of approximately ₤88600 per acre (note this compares to a value 
of vacant agricultural land at the time of approximately ₤2000 per acre). We use this value to define the 
urban growth boundary for our simulation. 
 
The final status quo planning parameter we require is an estimate of the share of land available within 
the built up area for private residential consumption, ω. We can solve for this from the standard 
equilibrium condition for an urban land market.  
 
Let N be the number of households, r is the rent function defined in equation (7), h represents the 
compensated demand for land, χ1 is the radius of the CBD and let χ(θ) represent the distance (in each 
direction θ) from the CBD at which land value falls to the value that defines the urban growth boundary.  
 


















Using the status quo utility level and taking sample mean prices for other attributes, we obtain an 
estimated internal space availability of ω=0.2568
5. This implies that just over a quarter of land within the 
urban growth boundary is actually made available for private residential consumption.  
 
In our analysis below, we assume that the parameter ω remains unchanged. The urban growth boundary 
represented by χ(θ) implies that the total area within the urban growth boundary is about 52553 acres. In 
solving for equilibria under alternative policies we impose the constraint that the total area of land 
devoted to urban uses remains unchanged. 
 
5. Policy Alternative: Transport Taxation 
 
The first alternative policy we consider is an ad valorem tax on the operating cost of transportation. We 
model this by changing the transport cost function to: 
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and then letting the boundary of the built up area be defined by the point at which land value falls to the 
price of agricultural land, taken to be ₤2000 per acre.  Land consumption and land rents are those that 
would characterise our representative agent approximation of the Reading urban area using the demand 
system estimated from the sample collected from that area. 
 
After allowing for changes in the spatial distribution of population, we calculate the total revenue 
generated from the tax and distribute this to households as an income transfer so that M becomes 
N
revenues total
M + . This income transfer increases the demand for land (and other house attributes in 
our demand system) and requires a further adjustment in the tax and utility level to accommodate all 
households. What we seek is an equilibrium in which the total tax revenue is distributed back to 
households, urban equilibrium is achieved and the total land used in the urban area is equal to the land 
area devoted to urban uses in the status quo.  Such an equilibrium will be characterised by a tax rate and 
an equilibrium utility level. The spatial density of households and land value function will in turn follow 
from these. 
                                                 
5 This value differs from that reported in Cheshire and Sheppard [2002] primarily because of the difference in the way the 
UGB is estimated here. This difference ￿ since it is consistent ￿ only affects that absolute values and means that those for the 
welfare costs cannot strictly be compared with the values reported in Cheshire and Sheppard [2002].   13 
 
Such an equilibrium  does exist and is described by: 
 
Utility =  14.6179 
Tax =  6.21884 
 
That is, to achieve the same level of urban land use using only a tax on the ￿operating cost￿ portion of 
transportation would require a 622% tax on such costs. As a result of this, the utility level of the 
representative agent would fall from 15.0631 to 14.6179. We stress that this is not because the tax 
revenues are spent within the urban area itself. Indeed, discarding the revenues altogether would achieve 
the same sized total urban area with a lower tax rate but actually result in an even lower utility level. 
 
The spatial structure of the equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 2 below. The heavy line indicates the 
maximum extent of urban land use under a policy of transport taxation, allowing the boundary to be set 
by the true agricultural land value. The thin line indicates the maximum extent in the status quo policy 
of an urban growth boundary. The circular line is for reference set at the distance of the furthest 
observation in our sample.  
 
Imposing a tax on operating costs alone results in a somewhat more ￿circular￿ pattern of land use 
because it increases the relative importance of part of transport costs that are less sensitive to travel 
speed. This was chosen for the simulation because it provides a better approximation to the type of fuel 
taxes or road user charges that have been proposed. 










Figure 2: Urban Development With Transport Tax 
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The pattern of land values produced in this equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 3. Again the thin line 
represents the equilibrium pattern of land values in the status quo, while the heavy line represents the 
land value in equilibrium with a transport tax.  
 
Note that the vertical scale is truncated. Under the transport tax the land value at the edge of the CBD 
rises to approximately ₤3 million (about a tenfold increase relative to that observed under the urban 
growth boundary). 
























Figure 3: Land Values With a Transport Tax 
 
Finally, Figure 4 presents the changes that would occur in the density of land use. As expected from 
such a severe change in land values, the change in equilibrium densities is substantial. The number of 
households per acre at the edge of the CBD would rise from the current value of just over 20 to more 
than 100. 





















Figure 4: Residential Density With a Transport Tax 
 
The tax revenues raised from this tax would be considerable. In equilibrium the tax would raise over 
₤558 million. All of these calculations are based on the final equilibrium. Obviously transformation of   15 
land use of this order of magnitude would take many years to achieve, and its political acceptability is 
problematic.  
 
6. Policy Alternative: Land Taxation 
 
We next turn attention to a policy alternative based on differential taxation of land that assigns a per acre 
tax (in addition to the current rates) on all land in urban residential use. This tax can be avoided entirely 
by keeping the land in agricultural use and would serve to increase the opportunity cost of urban 
residential land.  
 
Our microsimulation
6 is again based on a representative household model of the Reading urban area, and 
we further assume that the incidence of the property tax is fully borne by the residents. As before, we 
assume that all tax revenues are spent within the community and model this by rebating to each 
household an equal share of the total revenues collected by the pure land tax on residential land.  
 
Equilibrium will be a standard urban equilibrium in which households must pay the value of land plus 
the tax, and the distance at which land value falls to the value of agricultural land plus the present value 
of the tax burden determines the boundary of development. 
 
Such an equilibrium does exist and is described by: 
 
Utility =  15.3515 
Tax =  ₤3624.15 per acre 
 
Thus the land taxation equilibrium that achieves the same level of urban land use as the status quo would 
actually increase household welfare levels. The tax that would achieve this represents a significant 
increase over existing rates, but could be argued to be manageable. At typical residential densities of 10-
12 households per acre, the tax on residential land would represent an increase of approximately 50% in 
current Council tax levels. The associated increase in local expenditures could, at least, result in an 
increase in overall levels of welfare. 
 
The pattern of equilibrium land values (and effective cost of land including the present value of the tax) 
is illustrated below in Figure 5. The thin line indicates the pattern of land values that prevails under the 
existing urban growth boundary policy. The lower heavy line indicates the equilibrium pattern of land 
                                                 
6 All microsimulation calculations are done with Mathematica and the notebooks containing the models and calculations are 
available from the authors.   16 
values, and the upper heavy line indicates the equilibrium land cost to households (land value plus the 
present value of the stream of required tax payments). 
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Figure 5: Land Value and Cost With a Land Tax 
 
Figure 6 shows the equilibrium pattern of residential densities that emerge in equilibrium with a tax on 
land. While all policies achieve the same total amount of land in urban uses, the land tax produces a 
flatter density gradient than the urban growth boundary and much flatter than the transport tax. 
 




















Figure 6: Residential Density With a Land Tax 
 
The tax on residential land would produce less revenue than the transport tax - in equilibrium 
approximately ₤190.5 million per annum. Since the land tax increases the welfare level of the average 
household it seems reasonable to argue that it provides a more feasible policy alternative and dominates 
the existing policy based on urban growth boundaries. 
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We next provide some evaluation of the distributional effects of a land tax compared with maintaining 
the urban growth boundary. For this we must move away from our representative household model so 
that we can take account of the differences in income levels among households.   
 
Using equation (5) above we obtain an estimate of the utility each household achieves in the status quo. 
From our calculations using the representative household model we have an estimate of the average 
change in utility level and the tax rebate received by each household. We assume that each household 
achieves the same proportionate increase in welfare level and the same income rebate. This allows us to 
calculate, using equation (7) the bid rent that could be expected of each household in an equilibrium with 
the land tax. 
 
We then calculate, for each household, the amount of extra income that would be sufficient to generate 
the same utility level as they would, under these assumptions, achieve in an equilibrium where they 
faced the higher effective cost of land (land value plus tax) but received the benefit of the local tax 
expenditure. This equivalent variation in income will be positive on average, but not necessarily positive 
for each household. If a household￿s demographic structure, for example, leads it to demand large 
amounts of land then the local tax expenditure may be insufficient to compensate for the more costly 
land. 
 
We calculate the average equivalent variation in income to be approximately ₤422 per annum. This 
ranges from a high of a gain of ₤11525 to a low of a loss of ₤10400. These are not small quantities, 
given that the sample mean income after taxes is ₤29560.  Figure 7 presents a summary of the 
distributional impacts of the land tax. 
 
The sample households are divided into income quintiles, and the vertical bars show the share of total 
sample income accruing to each share. The line indicates the share of total equivalent variation in 
income accruing to each quintile. Each quintile receives a positive net benefit (relative to the urban 
growth boundary) from the land tax policy. Furthermore, the poorest quintile receives the largest share 
so that the policy change is significantly progressive. 
 
It should be stressed that the income quintiles represented here are for our sample, which is already 
restricted to owner-occupiers and hence drawn disproportionately from the most affluent two-thirds of 
the population. Nevertheless, it appears that switching from a land use policy based on an urban growth 
boundary to one based on land taxation could also contribute to a goal of reducing inequality.   18 




















There are a variety of policies that societies might consider to limit the extent of urban development. 
Much recent interest has been devoted to urban growth boundaries and other ￿smart growth￿ policies. 
Many British urban areas have been subject to such policies for long periods of time.  We have collected 
data from one such area, estimated the structure of demand for land and other house and neighbourhood 
attributes, and used this estimated structure as the basis for a microsimulation of alternative land use 
policies to achieve the same total area of urban land. 
 
We have considered two alternative policies: taxation of transportation and taxation of land. We found 
that both policy alternatives were capable of achieving the same level of urban land use as the status quo 
policy based on an urban growth boundary. While both policies could be used, there are very striking 
differences between them. 
 
A policy of transport taxation would require very high levels of taxation to achieve the land use goals 
achieved by the urban growth boundary. Furthermore, it would actually reduce welfare levels relative to 
the status quo. It would modify the built form of the urban area to generate very much higher densities 
closer to the fringe of the CBD. 
 
A policy of land taxation, on the other hand, could improve welfare levels and achieve the same levels of 
urban land use. While this would require significant increases in local property taxes, the levels required   19 
remain modest by the standards of many communities in North America. We also find that the land 
taxation policy would be strongly progressive relative to the urban growth boundary. 
 
Our analysis suggests that communities in the UK and those in the US considering urban growth 
boundaries may well benefit from giving serious consideration to the use of land taxation as an 
alternative. This should not necessarily be taken as a positive recommendation for introducing such 
taxes, however. The analysis presented here takes as its ￿datum￿ the status quo of very tight development 
constraint. As is shown in Cheshire and Sheppard [2002] this appears to represent a substantial net 
welfare cost relative to a more relaxed regulatory constraint on urban land supply - even allowing for the 
loss of open space amenities that would result.  Nevertheless the results in the present paper do strongly 
suggest that attacking the perceived problem directly with a pure land tax would achieve a given growth 
constraint at lower welfare costs compared either to the present regulatory system or compared to a tax 
on the operating costs of vehicles. Since this latter tax might possibly generate additional social benefits 
over and above those of increasing the supply of unbuilt open space (such as a quasi tax on congestion 
and atmospheric pollution) it cannot be dismissed as strictly less efficient. The size of the tax necessary 
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Table 1: Estimated Hedonic Price Function 
Continuous Attributes    Dichotomous Attributes 
Variable Estimate    Variable Estimate 
Constant 0.430174    ￿CentralHeat 0.053347 
t 3.897    t 2.891 
￿Bedrooms 0.029933    ￿Detached 0.221032 
t 1.884    t 4.614 
￿WC 0.061056    ￿Semi-detached 0.118829 
t 4.115    t 3.436 
￿SqFt 0.007858    ￿Terrace 0.02785 
t 4.184    t 1.102 
￿SchoolGCSE 0.003901    ￿Wide through street 0.023627 
t 3.051    t 1.206 
￿BlueCollar 0.02778    ￿B-Class road 0.016329 
t 2.350    t 0.153 
￿Ethnic 0.010976    ￿A-class road 0.035196 
t 2.163    t 0.679 
￿Industrial Land 0.004154    ￿Parking 0.033803 
t 2.686    t 1.498 
￿AccessOpenSpace 0.003223    ￿SingleGarage 0.043101 
t 1.338    t 1.863 
￿InaccessOpenSpace 0.000843   ￿DoubleGarage 0.081925 
t 1.049    t 2.334 
￿Elevation 0.000464    ￿ThamesFrontage 0.339446 
t 0.496    t 4.618 
Land Value function   ￿ LocalConstruction 0.007666 
￿1 0.064091    t 0.416 
t 3.210   ￿ Year2 0.027767 
￿2 -0.00083    t 1.338 
t -2.304   ￿ Year5 0.047747 
￿3 -0.00014    t 2.711 
t -1.113   ￿ Year6 0.110903 
￿4 -3.26736    t 3.096 
t -4.623      
Box-Cox parameters      
γ -0.06941      
t -0.893      
λ1 0.840378       
t 12.919      
λ3 0.208264       
t 1.766      
σ 0.119181    Log  Likelihood  -712.489 
t 5.774   Observations  461 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics, Prices, and Expenditure Shares for Sample 
Variable Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max  Description 
ADULTS  1.897106  0.618811 1 4  Number  of  Adults 
CHILDREN  0.858521  1.080285 0 4  Number  of  Children 
MHAT  3.478157 2.757165 0.481737 13.70793  Income  adjusted  for  hedonic 
ESTPRICE  9.309626  5.241151  3.5389  45.36409 Structure price estimated from hedonic 
SLAND  2.553258  1.332589  0.347236  7.96668 Expenditure share on land 
SBEDS  2.203248  1.225636  0.164506  5.710995 Expenditure share on bedrooms 
SWC  2.629387 1.744641 0.268627 8.951286  Expenditure  share  on  WC’s 
SSQFT  9.142989  5.501154  0.735887  28.10168 Expenditure share on Sq Ft interior space 
SBCOL  4.020366  2.107541  0.573379  12.98416 Expenditure share on avoid blue collar nbd 
SAFIN  2.49594  1.446089  0.177507  7.706844 Expenditure share on avoid ethnic nbd 
SINDU  5.416209  2.783108  0.741677  15.00779 Expenditure share on avoid local industrial land use 
SAMEN1  1.144407  0.638904  0.10858  3.811946 Expenditure share on accessible open space 
SAMEN2  0.327002  0.296338  0.009194  1.868709 Expenditure share on inaccessible open space 
SALT  0.162774  0.128151  0.00366  0.760515 Expenditure share on local elevation 
SGCSE  2.450426  1.51033  0.14816  9.290032 Expenditure share on school quality 
SST2  0.077652  0.243186  0  1.457162 Expenditure share on street being wide through road 
SST3  0.003255  0.040939  0  0.578579 Expenditure share on street being a "B" class road 
SST4  0.021408  0.144846  0  1.450225 Expenditure share on street being an "A" class road 
SSING  2.568107  3.61862  0  13.69357 Expenditure share on detached house 
STERR  0.201016  0.411929  0  2.110691 Expenditure share on terrace house 
SSEMI  0.822254  1.59143  0  8.925956 Expenditure share on semi-detached house 
SCENTH  1.274579  0.877165  0  4.043052 Expenditure share on central heat 
SOSPARK  0.157154  0.399491  0  2.521592 Expenditure share on off-street parking 
SSINGAR  0.675341  0.791927  0  3.26653 Expenditure share on single garage 
SDBLGAR  0.269837  0.814473  0  4.713673 Expenditure share on double garage 
SYEAR2  0.099402  0.291666  0  1.720246 Expenditure share on built in 1915-45 
SYEAR5  0.419968  0.723346  0  3.59282 Expenditure share on built in 1976-90 
SYEAR6  0.116884  0.669945  0  6.458597 Expenditure share on built after 1990 
SUNBLIT  0.171402  0.131037  0  0.580989 Expenditure share on avoid local construction  
STHAMES  0.134007  1.175906  0  13.66355 Expenditure share on Thames frontage 
SOTHER  60.44173  21.16822  0.616958  95.73976 Expenditure share on all other goods 
ESTRENT  0.002552 0.001153 0.000365 0.010029  Price  of  land 
PBEDS  0.018549 0.010449 0.007092 0.093752  Price  of  bedrooms 
PWC  0.041927 0.022667 0.016158 0.198166  Price  of  WC’s 
PSQFT  0.002865  0.001505  0.001265  0.013277 Price of Sq Ft interior space 
PBCOL  0.015259  0.009119  0.005348  0.079487 Price to avoid blue collar nbd 
PAFIN  0.00555  0.003279  0.00216  0.028853 Price to avoid ethnic nbd 
PINDU  0.001508  0.000921  0.000561  0.008065 Price to avoid local industrial land use 
PAMEN1  0.001508 0.000928 0.000533 0.008111  Price  of  accessible  open  space 
PAMEN2  0.0004 0.000228 0.000145 0.001819  Price  of  inaccessible  open  space 
PALT  0.000225 0.000131 0.000073 0.001086  Price  of  local  elevation 
PGCSE  0.001639 0.000983 0.000585 0.008516  Price  of  school  quality 
PST2  0.017755  0.010922  0.006253  0.095678 Price of street being wide through road 
PST3  0.012271  0.007549  0.004321  0.066124 Price of street being a "B" class road 
PST4  0.026449  0.016271  0.009314  0.142526 Price of street being an "A" class road 
PSING  0.166099  0.10218  0.058494  0.89507 Price of detached house 
PTERR 0.020928  0.012875  0.00737  0.112779  Price  of  terrace  house 
PSEMI  0.089296 0.054933 0.031447 0.481199  Price  of  semi-detached  house 
PCENTH  0.040089 0.024662 0.014118 0.216029  Price  of  central  heat   24 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics, Prices, and Expenditure Shares for Sample 
Variable Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max  Description 
POSPARK  0.025402 0.015627 0.008946 0.136885  Price  of  off-street  parking 
PSINGAR  0.032389 0.019925 0.011406 0.174538  Price  of  single  garage 
PDBLGAR  0.061564 0.037873 0.021681 0.331756  Price  of  double  garage 
PYEAR2  0.020866 0.012836 0.007348 0.112443  Price  of  built  in  1915-45 
PYEAR5  0.03588 0.022073 0.012636 0.193352  Price  of  built  in  1976-90 
PYEAR6  0.08334  0.051269  0.02935  0.449102 Price of built after 1990 
PNEWBLI  0.005761  0.003544  0.002029  0.031043 Price to avoid local construction  
PTHAMES  0.255083 0.156921 0.089831 1.374588  Price  of  Thames  frontage 
DISTANCE  404.2577  194.6626  55.97321  964.3506 Distance to city centre 
DIST1  24.55523  28.47504  1  220.0364 Distance to closest obs 
DIST2  36.69851  34.67988  2.828427  288.3834 Distance to next closest obs 
 Table 3: Demand System for Variable Attributes 
Coeff  Land  Bedrooms WC’s  Sq Ft  BlueCollar Ethnic  Industrial  Acc Open Inac Open  Elevation Schools  Other 
C  250.3682  -47.6037  -1.306 -362.6823  164.3365 139.1039 179.1604  20.308  -50.2145  32.3625 -62.8509 -681.9516 
t  1.3649  0.3453  0.007  0.5549  0.7678 0.9564 0.5762  0.2703  0.9776 1.3878  0.3527  0.3127 
Adults  0.0363  -0.0287 0.1001  -0.0396  -0.0833 -0.0033 -0.1297  -0.0139  -0.0355 -0.0137  -0.0922  0.533 
t  0.276  0.3051 0.8586  0.0894  0.5737  0.0323  0.648  0.2796  0.9731 0.9762 0.7687  0.3667 
Children  0.0883  0.018  0.0655  0.0881  0.0927 0.0839 0.1163  0.0249  0.0166 0.0059  0.039 -0.4953 
t  1.2616  0.3532 0.8736  0.3695  1.167  1.5623  1.041  0.9374  0.8339 0.6757 0.5708  0.6483 
Phat  -36.445  4.5796 0.1468 28.9345  -21.042 -20.261  -29.2063  -3.855  4.9479 -4.7004 5.9514  146.4294 
t  1.5431  0.2607 0.0062  0.3508  0.7538  1.0622  0.721  0.3983  0.7626 1.5793 0.2598  0.5249 
RealIncome 2.0194 1.8234 2.338 6.9748 3.6654  2.3693 4.692  1.0074 0.2765  0.1432  1.9106  -33.2789 
t  7.4843  9.4239 7.8117  7.6723 11.6022  10.8266  10.8891  9.0705  3.5874 4.6293 7.0187 11.0157 
PLand  0.3821  -0.0312  -0.0806  -0.8273  -0.3391 -0.2663 -0.3662  -0.0474  -0.2173 -0.0537  -0.4481  1.3333 
t  1.3209  0.1708  0.2962  0.8066  1.1556 1.2365 0.8867  0.4532  2.3411 1.2746  1.8736  0.4942 
PBeds  7.4977  -4.2708 8.0073 31.9157  2.8372  1.7733 -2.1743 -1.7504  5.039 -0.0332 3.9589  -57.6321 
t  1.0253  0.8045  1.1852  1.2806  0.3497 0.3249 0.1902  0.5727  2.2865 0.0349  0.5747  0.7112 
PWC  7.1198  -0.033  -13.7845  0.2672  2.4272 3.5608 3.9743  1.0942  -1.606 1.0369  -6.1229  3.4064 
t  1.2801  0.0087  3.155  0.0153  0.3587 0.7564 0.4228  0.4783  1.0961 1.5731  1.2927  0.0529 
PSqFt  0.7494  -7.5801 -3.4602 -91.0117  11.0336 10.6504 19.4912  4.4751  -5.5513  1.322 -1.4425  49.9913 
t  0.0582  0.7861 0.2644  1.9575  0.785  1.126  0.9767  0.8793  1.4112 0.8205 0.1199  0.3343 
PBCol  1.8003  1.6741 1.4696  3.1319  -19.0582 -0.6488  2.4029  0.1854  -1.5957 0.5293 0.6219  -35.594 
t  0.4521  0.6207 0.3988  0.2298  4.0659  0.2044  0.393  0.1299  1.5816 1.2131 0.2001  0.8136 
PEthnic  3.1507  0.2874  1.9638  -0.9811  4.8826  -4.1688  4.6694  0.8886  0.6669  0.5855 -0.2271 -15.8936 
t  1.0569  0.1315  0.7441  0.0984  1.3231 1.8113 0.8933  0.7766  0.8559 1.6761  0.0978  0.4673 
PIndus  9.9519  3.4031 0.0068  17.253 11.7468  4.525 -7.5015  3.135  -1.6852 1.3887 3.3691  -41.9581 
t  1.2414  0.6167  0.001  0.6184  1.3363 0.8397 0.6112  1.1096  0.7749 1.4616  0.501  0.4821 
PAccOpen  -0.3671  -0.2673 2.3505  -0.6418  1.6524  1.2179  1.28 -5.3549  0.5458 0.0195 0.2695  -4.1436 
t  0.1815  0.2037  1.2459  0.1002  0.6868 0.7156 0.3899  7.2463  0.9769 0.0808  0.164  0.1903 
PInaccOpen  0.4555 -0.3792  -0.4597 -2.4429  0.1399 0.0034 0.5406 -0.0472 -1.4005 0.0256  0.1553  5.9263 
t  0.6372  0.781  0.7268  1.0676  0.1834 0.0068 0.5107  0.1942  6.8727 0.3299  0.2586  0.7949 
PElev  -0.0484  0.1389  0.6505  0.8137  0.4105 0.5121 0.1706 -0.0527  0.186  -0.5309  0.3418 -8.2304 
t  0.1001  0.3958  1.3478  0.484  0.7867 1.4323 0.2284  0.2947  1.3268 7.6841  0.7767  1.4976 
PSchool  3.7819  0.0762  0.4119  3.0036  0.9203 0.3846 1.2126  0.1863  0.0161 0.2206 -9.449 -6.8173 
t  3.4264  0.0865  0.3118  0.7517  0.7058 0.4623 0.6604  0.4639  0.0552  1.733  9.0378  0.5208 
R-squared: 0.6645 0.816  0.8239 0.784  0.8251  0.8231  0.8137  0.8172  0.4438  0.528  0.8183  0.8449 
Adj  R-square 0.6474  0.8066  0.8149  0.773  0.8162 0.8141 0.8042  0.8079  0.4155  0.504  0.8091  0.837   26 
Table 4: Demand System for Dichotomous Attributes 
Coeff  Street2  Street3 Street4 Detached Terrace Semi  CentHeat Parking 1Garage 2Garage  BldYr2  BldYr5  BldYr6  LocalBld  Thames 
C  35.7739  -20.061 47.233 -44.0347  26.1281  4.2479 -94.4885  38.0601  229.9393  -179.2325  -12.1724  -216.9441  112.6463  21.4531  572.4215 
t  0.4361  1.2461  1.4618  0.0707 0.2138  0.0095  0.4701 0.2962  0.9737  0.776 0.1265  1.07  0.5442  0.703  1.5773 
Adults  0.0305  0.0102 -0.028  0.1702 0.0344 -0.2905  0.0834 0.0135  0.0541  -0.1203 0.0174  -0.0411 -0.1292  -0.0266 -0.0075 
t  0.713  1.1535  1.4682  0.3947 0.4588  1.0428  0.6456 0.1566  0.3983  0.943 0.2898  0.3248  1.5778 1.2896  0.0499 
Children  0.0137  -0.0011 0.033 -0.1277  0.0102 0.0095  0.0622  0.0153  0.0716  -0.1583  -0.0072 -0.0218  -0.0274  -0.0051  -0.0109 
t  0.4444  0.3158  2.0019  0.4972  0.225 0.0548  0.8901  0.2914  0.8776  1.8956  0.208  0.2629 0.5761  0.4358 0.1083 
Phat  -4.6456 2.4285  -5.4224  9.0864 -1.7345  -11.0788  7.8477 -7.4301 -29.2275  22.0454  0.2151  30.9535  -12.9613 -3.4658  -72.0905 
t  0.4472  1.2258  1.314  0.1143 0.1101  0.1961  0.3093 0.4573  0.9726  0.7421 0.0175  1.1802  0.5104 0.8963  1.563 
RealIncome  0.0774  -0.0118  -0.0212  2.4503 0.1516  0.4488  0.9769 0.3367  0.7277  0.1786  0.071  -0.1082  0.3205 0.1967  0.2639 
t  0.8931  0.8958  0.4723  2.5464  0.739 0.8421  3.1335  1.8436  2.3956  0.5219 0.8242  0.3584 1.3197  3.9938 0.7197 
Pland  -0.14  0.0255  0.0121  -0.4107 0.3287 -0.5932  0.0404 0.1713  -0.1569  -0.1989 0.1098  0.4299  0.1784  -0.0859  1.2513 
t  1.3755  0.9296  0.1746  0.4033 1.9468  0.8959  0.1218 1.0948  0.4411  0.4756 0.7722  1.4309  0.566 1.7111  2.2631 
Pbeds  0.3296 0.4904  -0.1419  5.4514  -3.9888  0.6614  8.3736 3.9863  -7.1051  0.9016  2.0229  -5.3317 -0.6946 1.1038 -1.2271 
t  0.166  1.0226  0.1048  0.2183 1.0336  0.047  1.1822 1.0191  0.9684  0.117 0.6523  0.7171  0.0904  0.936  0.123 
PWC  -0.0762  -0.2904  -0.1757  -17.1066 0.5384  12.896  0.5641 3.0213  3.841  -1.5161 1.7121  -11.2445 -2.7244 0.9126  8.308 
t  0.0446  0.9589  0.2096  1.037 0.2063  1.1827  0.1115 1.2147  0.7011  0.2312 0.6335  2.1072  0.5118 1.2449  0.7101 
PSqFt  0.7581  -1.2345  2.6449  4.6832 4.7574  -28.1767  -13.8193  -0.562 21.9872 -18.6337 -4.0858  3.8208  7.6341  -2.6623  34.2212 
t 0.1389  1.2122  1.1464  0.105  0.5924  0.9179  0.9813  0.059  1.3685  1.2295  0.6485  0.2935  0.503  1.1797  1.5225 
PBCol  1.1129  -0.0889  -0.0156 -2.8658  -3.4337  25.2739  0.5282  1.701  5.3142  0.3937 0.8826  2.5076 2.5213  0.2568 10.993 
t  0.9095  0.4906  0.0277  0.2174 1.9913  3.0549  0.1697 0.8012  1.4514  0.0941 0.6108  0.6594  0.8688 0.3967  1.8285 
Pethnic  -0.298  -0.1582  -0.1798  6.6238 0.1323 -6.7524  0.5479  0.34  1.2591  -0.9515 0.0106  -3.8333  1.9708 0.1419  5.3224 
t  0.3496  0.9962  0.3077  0.8395 0.0882  1.2477  0.2083 0.2084  0.4304  0.327 0.0097  1.5716  1.005 0.3201  1.2928 
Pindus  0.7882  -1.1475 2.3728 -10.7632  4.1007  7.484  -2.0792 -1.9988  3.1139  -1.4945  -1.583 -10.4509 -0.4287 2.3716  6.0798 
t  0.2995  1.3212  1.5725  0.4298 0.9897  0.4341  0.2684 0.4879  0.3738  0.1704 0.4375  1.3543  0.0528 1.8871  0.4738 
PAccOpen  0.7908  0.0132  0.4418  3.0891 -0.066  -3.2463 -2.9233  0.0839  0.6476  -1.0636 0.2452 -2.1847 3.0344  0.1418 4.4352 
t  1.1302  0.1471  1.1974  0.4997 0.0674  0.6943  1.4656 0.0794  0.3137  0.5019 0.2856  1.0591  1.0384  0.446  1.4997 
PInaccOpen 0.4817  -0.0985  0.1659 -4.3366  0.0194 1.8522 -0.7596  -0.1327  0.59  -0.5968  -0.1241 -1.1469 0.1312  0.1184 1.3194 
t  1.8999  1.3233  1.3215  1.7383 0.0516  1.2253  1.0794 0.3301  0.8063  0.7438 0.3608  1.6632  0.1997 1.1149  1.2913 
Pelev  0.2515  0.0722  -0.1156  2.2318  -0.3891 0.1956  0.8207  0.0138 -0.1078  0.4943 0.0714  0.0163 0.7242  -0.0184 1.3773 
t  1.5504  1.2897  1.4735  1.2077 1.5346  0.1724  1.6431 0.0538  0.2032  0.7198 0.3561  0.0311  1.0568  0.188  1.2946 
Pschool  0.267  0.0164  0.4609  4.8599  -0.3753  -1.5614 -0.4804  0.5766 -0.3154  0.2515 0.5465 -2.5471 0.7894  0.6177 2.9461 
t  0.6844  0.3664  1.6709  1.2879 0.5521  0.6906  0.4412 0.7879  0.2653  0.2084 1.2702  2.2317  0.7321 3.3581  1.6869 
R-squared:  0.0829  -0.5947  -0.1741  0.4653 0.1461 -0.0969  0.3306 0.0005  0.0229  -0.1887 -0.0817  -0.2649 -0.0026 0.0836 -0.0369 
Adj  R-square 0.0363  -0.6758  -0.2337  0.4381 0.1027 -0.1527  0.2966  -0.0503  -0.0268  -0.2492 -0.1367  -0.3292 -0.0535  0.037 -0.0897 
  